involves the complete renunciation of the claim to rule out mind from all natural processes, that claim which was at once its most magnificent gesture and the most certain mark of its intrinsic weakness and error. As Prof. A. N. Whitehead has recently put it: 'We have now the task of defining natural facts, so as to understand how mental occurrences are operative in conditioning the subsequent course of Nature.'[1] In short, mind, which for so long has been excluded from Nature as a supernatural adjunct to be dealt with only by turning one's back resolutely upon it, has now to be reconciled with the enemies created by itself—namely, physical science and the too sub-servient imitators of that science, the biological sciences. In short, we have now to naturalize the supernatural, to recognize the teleological, the purposive, the intelligent, the predictive, the qualitative, the valuative, the hedon-istic forms of activity, as just as natural as the purely mechanical, and perhaps more so.

A science which tells you on one page that the speed of light is an absolute constant; on another that standards of length are relative and variable from moment to moment; and on a third that a straight line is a meaningless form of words; a science which refuses to stand sponsor for any meanings that may seem to be implied by the pointer-readings which are the only phenomena it can take seriously; a science for which matter, energy, and force are nothing more than sense-data, or, at the best, abstractions justified in a limited way for certain purposes ;

a science which, in Whitehead's words, has become * a sort of mystic chant over an unintelligible universe '— such a science (no matter how brilliant its achievements), is in no position to dictate negations and prohibitions to

[1] *Nature and Life,* Cambridge, 1934.